“The ethnic dichotomy of ‘self’ and ‘other’ in the interwar international law of minority protection.” by Shahabuddin, M
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/3435455/WORKINGFOLDER/FNCH/9781107029330C16.3D 407 [407–426] 5.10.2012
1:56AM
16
The ethnic dichotomy of ‘self ’ and ‘other’ within




The concept of ‘ethnicity’ emanating from the Greek root ethnos has
always been used to refer to the ‘other’ in a derogatory sense.1 However,
from about the mid-nineteenth century, in the German Romantic liter-
ature the notion of ‘otherness’ in ethnos shifted to the image of the ‘self ’,
expressed through the dominant political vocabulary of the nineteenth
century – ‘nation’.2 Such a romantic image of the nation having its
foundation in ethnicity was destined to exclude the remaining ‘other’
in the process of constructing the ‘self ’.3 Conversely, if the liberal nation
* I am indebted to Professor Antony Anghie, Professor Matthew Craven and Professor
David Kennedy for their insightful comments on the draft chapter.
1 E. Tonkin, M. McDonald and M. Chapman, History and Ethnicity (Routledge, 1989),
pp. 11–20.
2 As the etymology of the term demonstrates, ‘nation’ used to refer to shared biological
characteristics. Deriving from the past participle of the verb nasci, meaning to be born,
the Latin noun nationem connotes breed or race. SeeW. Connor, ‘ANation Is a Nation, Is
a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a ?’ in J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism
(Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 38. Although at some medieval universities, a
student’s nationem designated the sector of the country from which he came, when
introduced into the English language in the late thirteenth century, nation was with its
primary connotation of a blood-related group (ibid.). In this sequence, it is also argued
that in the nineteenth century, as in the Middle Ages, nations were conceived of as units
of common biological descent as well as of common culture. See, S. Raynolds, ‘Regional
Sentiments and Medieval Communities’ in Hutchinson and Smith (eds.), Nationalism,
p. 139.
3 J. G. von Herder, ‘Reﬂections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind (1791)’ in
O. Dahbour and M. R. Ishay (eds.), The Nationalism Reader (New Jersey: Humanities
Press, 1995), pp. 48–57; J. G. Fichte, ‘An Outline of International and Cosmopolitan Law
(1796–97)’ in H. S. Reiss and P. Brown (eds.), The Political Thought of the German
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is conceived as the reﬂection of universal spirit in the temporal form,
ethnicity must remain at the sidelines in the liberal construction of
the nation.4 Thus, the liberal discourse on whether the ethnic ‘other’
should be assimilated or allowed to maintain cultural distinctiveness is
informed by an instrumental understanding of ethnicity.
Against this nineteenth-century backdrop, this chapter demonstrates
how ‘ethnicity’ expressed through this dichotomy of ‘self ’ and ‘other’
along the line of the liberal and conservative traditions informed the
inter-war international law of minority protection at three different levels.
First, the inter-war minority protection system came into being as a com-
promise between the liberal and conservative traditions vis-à-vis ethnicity
and its role in the political organisation of nation-States. The idea of
minority rights appeared as a fall-back position whenever Wilson’s propo-
sition of the right to self-determination in conservative terms could not be
realised. In such a case, liberal individualism as well as the assimilationist
agenda always coexisted with the conservative ethnic notion of the ‘minor-
ity’. Second, a dichotomy of the liberal Western ‘self ’ and the conservative
Eastern ‘other’ was evident in the imposition of special minority protection
obligations on Eastern and Central European (ECE) States, whereas minor-
ities withinWestern Europe remained outside any international protection.
And ﬁnally, the inherent drawbacks of the system (that became evident in
its actual operation) demonstrated another layer of the self–other discourse
in which bypassing the international system, the agenda of mutual exclu-
sion of the ethnic ‘other’was brutally pursued in the process of constructing
the ethnic self-image along the conservative line.
II. Minority rights as the halfway between the liberal and
conservative traditions
The Peace Conference following the Great War aggravated the minority
issue by drastically redrawing the frontiers in Eastern and Central
Romantics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), pp. 73–84; J. G. Fichte, ‘Addresses to the
German Nation – Thirteenth Address (1808)’ in Reiss and Brown (eds.), The Political
Thought of the German Romantics, pp. 102–8; L. von Ranke, ‘The Great Powers (1833)’ in
Dahbour and Ishay (eds.), The Nationalism Reader, pp. 158–9.
4 See, G.W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (1837), D. Forbes and
H. B. Nisbet (eds.) (Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 76–97, 147–51; J. S. Mill,
‘Considerations on Representative Government (1861)’ in Three Essays (Oxford
University Press, 1975), pp. 380–8; J. E. E. Dalberg-Acton (Lord Acton), The History of
Freedom and Other Essays, J. N. Figgis and V. L. Reginald (eds.) (Macmillan & Co. Ltd.,
1907), pp. 289–93.
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Europe that followed the collapse of the old empires. In the aftermath of
the war, international law had to respond to this minority ‘problem’
against the backdrop of the most inﬂuential notion of the time – self-
determination. In his famous Fourteen Points, Wilson enshrined the
notion of self-determination, without actually using the term, as one of
the key guiding principles of the post-war international order.5 In the
aftermath of the war, his ﬁrst draft of the Covenant categorically men-
tioned in Article III the principle of self-determination along with the
provision of certain territorial adjustments which was to qualify themutual
guarantee of political independence and territorial integrity among the
contracting powers.6
However, the Wilsonian proposition of self-determination, being
premised on the centrality of ethnicity in the political organisation of
nation-States, faced criticism even from other American delegates, as it
transpired that the territorial adjustments made at the Paris Peace
Conference were unlikely to satisfy all nationalist claims, and therefore,
would not prevent ethnic tensions erupting. David Miller – an American
jurist and also one of the draftsmen of the Covenant – in his comment
on Wilson’s draft, asserted that such a general provision of self-
determination ‘will make that dissatisfaction permanent, will compel
every Power to engage in propaganda and will legalise irredentist agi-
tation in at least all of Eastern Europe’.7
Miller was not alone in criticising Wilson’s proposition. It is evident
from the US Secretary of State, Robert Lansing’s personal narrative of the
peace negotiations in Paris, that he was extremely critical of the idea of
self-determination as a general principle, let alone as a right.8 Faced with
vehement opposition from other statesmen, Wilson dropped the idea of
self-determination in his fourth draft and also in the Covenant, never-
theless Lansing found it regrettable that such opposition did not obtain
from Wilson an open disavowal of the principle as the standard for the
determination of sovereign authority; hence, the phrase remained one of
the general bases for peace negotiation.9
5 For the full text of Wilson’s address to the Congress, see, G. R. Suriano (ed.), Great
American Speeches (Gramercy Books, 1993), pp. 143–6.
6 See, D.H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, vol. II (G P Putnam’s Sons, 1928), p. 70.
7 Ibid., p. 71.
8 R. Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (Houghton Mifﬂin Company,
1921), p. 95.
9 Ibid.
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Perhaps Wilson himself was aware of the limitations of his policy of
self-determination expressed along the conservative line, and therefore,
he had to deviate from this principle on a number of occasions. In a note
written on 30 December 1918, Lansing claims that in the actual appli-
cation of the principle Wilson, rather, relied on a number of exceptions
to his own creation: millions of ethnic Germans were denied the right to
self-determination and transferred to the new States of Poland and
Czecho-Slovakia under the Treaty of Versailles; Austrian Tyrol was
ceded to the Kingdom of Italy against the will of substantially the entire
population of that region under the Treaty of Saint-Germain; Austria
was denied the right to form a political union with Germany; the peoples
of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan were
left to the mercy of Great Russia despite their distinct identities and
aspirations to become independent States.10
However, during the peace negotiations, efforts were made to reconcile
the classical notion of sovereignty and the conservative notion of self-
determination. As Miller asserted, since the principle of self-determination
could not be generally applied, ‘[i]t is submitted that the contrary principle
should prevail; as the drawing of boundaries according to racial or social
conditions is in many cases an impossibility, protection of the rights of
minorities and acceptance of such protection by the minorities constitute the
only basis of enduring peace’.11
Thus, on the one hand, instead of Wilson’s initial proposal of incorpo-
rating self-determination as a general principle, an unqualiﬁed guarantee
of political independence and territorial integrity of all State members of
the League was stipulated, and on the other, the nationalities within the
new States, which were not granted the right to self-determination due to
pragmatic or strategic reasons, were put under an international mecha-
nism of minority protection. In other words, the notion of the protection
of minorities appeared as a fall-back position where the principle of self-
determination in the conservative sense could not be applied.
Yet, it was not easy for the liberal West to design a mechanism for the
protection of Eastern minorities, who not only were depicted as the
product of the conservative Eastern tradition of relying on ethnicity for
the political organisation of nation-States, but also allegedly desired to
10 Ibid., pp. 98–100. See also, M. Mazower, Hitler’s Empire – Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe
(Penguin Books, 2009 [2008]), pp. 33–4.
11 Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, vol. II, p. 71, emphasis in original.
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maintain their ethnic features.12 This resulted in an attempt to reconcile
both traditions. It is, therefore, a signiﬁcant characteristic of the inter-
war minority protection mechanism that while producing a number of
legal experimentations to ‘manage’ nationalist passions,13 it actually
avoided any general recognition of minority rights. Instead of inserting
any provision on minority protection in the League Covenant, as Wilson
initially proposed, a series of minority treaties were concluded to put
certain ECE States under the treaty obligation of protecting minorities
within their territories, with the guarantee mechanism being entrusted to
the League.14
However, the fact remains that Wilson himself had something else in
mind. During the session of the Supreme Council on 23 June 1919, in a
brief exchange with Headlam-Morley – a member of the British dele-
gation – about the use of minority language as a medium of instruction
in schools in Poland, Wilson is reported to have expressed the view that
the American model of cultural assimilation should also be applicable to
Eastern and Central Europe. When he was reminded that the German
population was long established in the territories to be ceded and in some
Polish towns even constituted the majority, he replied: ‘Yes, but their
properties will become part of Poland and it is not our wish that they
remain German forever.’15
Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that throughout the Peace Conference,
Wilson had to advance his pro-minority ideas under immense pressure
from his counterparts in Europe, and even his deputies. Regarding the
Jewish population in ECE States, at a session of the Council of Four on 1
May 1919, the US President indeed drew the attention of the Supreme
Council to the anti-Semitic pogroms in Poland and Romania and read out
12 This aspect of the inter-war minority protection mechanism will be detailed in the
following section.
13 See generally, N. Berman, ‘A Perilous Ambivalence: Nationalist desire, Legal Autonomy,
and the Limits of Interwar Framework’, (1992) 33(2) Harvard International Law
Journal, 353–80; also, N. Berman, ‘But the Alternative is Despair: European
Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law’, (1993) 106 Harvard
Law Review, 1792–904.
14 In Article 12 of the Polish Minority Treaty, which served as a model minority treaty,
Poland agreed that ‘the stipulation in the Foregoing Articles, so far as they affect persons
belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of interna-
tional concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations’.
15 P. Mantoux, Deliberations du Conseil des Quatres. Notes de L’Ofﬁcier Interprete, vol. II
(Paris: 1955), p. 489, cited in C. R. von Frenz, A Lesson Forgotten – Minority Protection
under the League of Nations: The Case of the German Minority in Poland, 1920–1934
(London: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 66.
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the Jewish draft treaty of 29 April, but he had to agree with the other
members in their unanimous rejection of any demands for a ‘group
autonomy’.16 Lloyd George adopted the same assimilationist approach
towards the Jewish minorities in Poland: ‘every effort ought to be made
for the Jews of Poland to merge in Polish nationality, just as the Jews in
Great Britain or France becamemerged in British and French nationality’.17
He was particularly concerned about the risk of ‘the creation of a state
within a state’ associated with the claim of autonomy for the minorities.18
Ultimately, while deﬁning the protected minorities in the Polish
Minority Treaty, the phrase ‘persons belonging to linguistic, racial and
religious minorities’ rather than ‘national minorities’ was used in order
to avoid their recognition as a separate legal corporation within the
State.19 Given the liberal underpinning of the French understanding of
nationalism, France even initially refused to endorse any objective cri-
teria such as ethnicity, language or religion as the basis of the application
of the right to self-determination; instead, it proposed the principle of
plebiscite that would guarantee the primacy of individual choice in
conformity with the French liberal ideology.20 Although the provision
of plebiscite was not extended to most of the transferred territories, there
was essentially a right for the transferred population to decide on their
political allegiance, which again demonstrated the tendency of reducing
the collectivism in the notion of minority to individualism.21
Thus, to what extent the raison d’être of the minority protection
regime was the ‘protection’ of minorities at all (in line with the con-
servative tradition) remains an open question. The Report of de Mello-
Franco22 revealed that the architects of the minority protection system in
no way envisioned the minorities as groups of inhabitants who would
regard themselves as permanently foreign to the general organisation of
16 Mantoux, Deliberations, vol. I, p. 440, cited in Frenz, A Lesson Forgotten, p. 59.
17 Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1913–21, The Paris
Peace Conference 1919, vol. VI (Government Printing Press, 1942), p. 626.
18 Mantoux, Deliberations, p. 440, cited in Frenz, A Lesson Forgotten, p. 59.
19 See Article 12 of the Polish Minority Treaty.
20 French government note of 15 November 1918 sent to the US Government. See FRUS,
The Paris Peace Conference 1919, vol. I, p. 349.
21 See Article 91(3) of the Versailles Treaty of 28 June 1919 which stipulated: ‘Within a
period of two years after the coming into force of the present Treaty, German nationals
over 18 years of age habitually resident in any of the territories recognised as forming
part of Poland will be entitled to opt for German nationality.’
22 Report of A. deMello-Franco, Council Meeting of 9 December 1925 in League of Nations
Ofﬁcial Journal, 7(2) (February, 1926), 142.
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the country; instead, they intended for the minorities certain legal pro-
tection which might gradually prepare the way for conditions necessary
for the establishment of a complete ‘national unity’within an environment
of mutual respect. Joseph Roucek noted that the minority treaties never
intended to mitigate the differences of groups within a State; in contrast,
the treaties had a desire to promote the consolidation of the States who
would then give to the minorities certain rights, and thereby protect them
from ultra nationalism, and in this way, contain ethnic tensions leading to
international conﬂict.23 Legal adviser to the American Peace Commission
to Paris, Manley Hudson, wrote in 1921 that in that troubled situation of
world affairs, the ﬁrst and foremost responsibility of the Peace Conference
was to establish a stable peace, and in this connection, it was mandatory to
anticipate new irredentisms, which might call for future vindication.24 In
that sense, the idea of minority protection, as a safety valve, came on board
when it was more or less ascertained that the conservative right to self-
determination could not be applied to all nationalities, a fact that had the
necessary potential for destabilising the peace that the Paris Conference
was expected to bring forth.
However, it would be less than fair to portray the interwar minority
protection regime as a purely assimilationist mission. Instead, efforts
were made to reconcile the victors’ liberal ideology with the conservative
ethnic-nationalism of the East, which ultimately provided the minority
treaties with a hybrid character and the whole regime with a transitory
nature. The Polish Minority Treaty that served as a model for other
similar minority treaties is an archetypical example of such an effort of
reconciliation. On the one hand, Poland guaranteed equality before law
and undertook to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty
as well as the free exercise of religion and language to all inhabitants of
Poland without any distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or
religion;25 on the other hand, Poland had to guarantee that the minor-
ities within its territory would enjoy the same treatment and security as
the other Polish nationals, and also an ‘equal right to establish, manage
and control at their expense charitable, religious and social institutions,
schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their
23 J. S. Roucek, The Working of the Minorities System under the League of Nations (Orbis
Publishing Co., 1929), p. 74.
24 M. O. Hudson, ‘The Protection of Minorities and Natives in the Transferred Territories’
in E. M. House (ed.),What Really Happened at Paris? The Story of the Peace Conference,
1918–1919 by American Delegates (NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1921), p. 208.
25 Articles 2 and 7 of the Polish Minority Treaty.
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own language and to exercise their religion freely therein’.26 Therefore, the
Polish Minority Treaty adopted a hybrid character incorporating both
liberal individualism and the conservative ethnic group phenomenon. As
Thornberry notes, ‘[t]he ﬁrst two classes of rights above, dealing with the
rights of all inhabitants and nationals, reﬂect the preoccupations of
Western statesmen, who were convinced that whatever rights minorities
should have would be served best in a liberal setting’.27
The hybridity of the minority rights regime under the League
appeared precisely in the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court in
the Minority Schools in Albania case, wherein the Court declared:
The idea underlying the treaties for the protection of minorities is to
secure for certain elements incorporated in a State, the population of
which differs from them in race, language or religion, the possibility of
living peacefully alongside that population and co-operating amicably
with it, while at the same time preserving the characteristics which
distinguish them from the majority, and satisfying the ensuring special
needs.28
Thus, to attain this object, the Court continued, it was necessary to
ensure that not only were minorities treated equally to the other nation-
als of the State, but also that suitable means for the preservation of their
racial peculiarities, their traditions and their national characteristics
were made available.29
Although Berman argues that in this case the Court, by relying on the
minorities’ view of their ‘essential’ requirement, attempted to deviate from
the assimilationist approach of the peacemakers,30 the Dissenting Opinion
reveals that a simultaneous counter effort was made to underscore the
assimilationist goal of the minority rights regime with the argument that
the interpretation of the Albanian Declaration of 2 October 1921 con-
cerning the protection of minorities must not deviate from the actual will
of the State parties.31 In the German Settlers case, while underscoring the
primacy of the private rights of individual settlers, and thereby extending
protection to the members of the ethnic German community under Polish
repression, the Court bypassed the political aspects of the whole issue of
26 Article 8 of the Polish Minority Treaty. Also Article 9 thereof relating to the use of
minority language in schools located in minority-populated areas.
27 P. Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Clarendon Press, 1991),
p. 43.
28 PCIJ Report (1935), Ser. A/B, No. 64, p. 17. 29 Ibid.
30 Berman, ‘A Perilous Ambivalence’, pp. 370–2.
31 PCIJ Report (1935), Ser. A/B, No. 64, p. 27.
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Germanisation – a product of conservative German nationalist thrust –
declaring that the political purpose behind the colonisation scheme could
not affect the private rights acquired under the German Civil Code.32 On
the other hand, the Court refuted the Polish claim of constructing and
consolidating their national ‘self ’ through the process of de-Germanisation
in this particular context.33 The Permanent Court’s attitude towards eth-
nicity located against the backdrop of liberalism – the ideology that had
been juxtaposed with conservative Romanticism throughout the nine-
teenth century and now emerged victorious – symbolised the inter-war
minority protection mechanism in the most signiﬁcant way.
A similar compromising attitude was also demonstrated in the fact
that although minority groups as separate entities were recognised in
practice, formally the League repeatedly denied any international stand-
ing for minority groups. The League was rather comfortable with the
understanding that the arrangements were between the treaty States and
the League, the latter being the guarantor of the promises made by the
former.34 And in this way, the ‘minority’ itself was denied direct access to
the mechanism supposedly designed for its protection, and thereby,
pushed to the periphery in the discourse on the protection of their rights.
As Roucek approvingly wrote in a publication of 1929, the minority
treaties did not constitute the minorities as new special subjects of
international law; the protection of minorities was, thus, given interna-
tionally, but within the State.35
Thus, the inter-war minority protection regime demonstrated an
inherent tension between the conservative ethnic notion of minority
protection and the liberal assimilationist agenda of the victors of the
war. Efforts were made to mitigate this tension by various actors, the
Permanent Court being the most prominent in this context. However,
such efforts were marked with a clear message of undesirability of ethnic
‘primitiveness’ – a fact that characterised the whole minority protection
regime in a number of ways.
32 Questions Relating to Settlers of German Origin in Poland Case, PCIJ Report (1925), Ser.
B, No. 6, p. 33.
33 Ibid., p. 37. See also, Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia,
PCIJ Report (1926), Ser. A, No. 7; and Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, PCIJ
Report (1925), Ser. B, No. 3; PCIJ Report (1928), Ser. A, No. 17.
34 FRUS, The Paris Peace Conference 1919, vol. VI, p. 514.
35 Roucek, The Working of the Minorities System, p. 75.
ethnic dichotomy within minority protection 415
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/3435455/WORKINGFOLDER/FNCH/9781107029330C16.3D 416 [407–426] 5.10.2012
1:56AM
III. The liberal West and its conservative ‘other’ within Europe
Subjecting some States of Eastern and Central Europe to an international
scrutiny of minority protection under the League, instead of creating a
universal system of minority protection, naturally engendered protest
and anger among the representatives of these States during the Paris
Peace Conference.36 While responding to such oppositions, the Western
Great Powers attempted to locate the special obligations for the ECE
States in a historical continuum – obligations that new entrants of the
international society must commit to. This appeared clearly in
Clemenceau’s letter to Paderewski in response to Poland’s position
against any special obligation of minority protection for her under the
Polish Minority Treaty.37 Referring to the Congress of Berlin (the
Protocol of 28 June 1878), Clemenceau asserted that the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers would be false to the responsibility
which rested upon them if they departed from this established tradition
of stipulating additional responsibility for new States.38
Clemenceau’s effort to historicise the imposition of special obligations
on new States was later substantiated by a number of publicists. For
example, Hudson shared the view that there were sufﬁcient precedents
before the peacemakers in Paris for imposing additional obligations on
the new States, and on States to which large accessions of territory were
to be made.39 In a publication of 1928, Mair recorded the earliest
36 See League of Nations, The League of Nations and the Protection of Minorities, p. 17. See
also, FRUS, The Paris Peace Conference 1919, vol. VI, p. 88; ibid., vol. III, p. 400; H.W. V.
Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, vol. V (Henry Frowde
and Hodder and Stoughton, 1921), p. 129. The meeting took place in an environment
of conﬁdentiality; the press were excluded and the proceedings were regarded as
conﬁdential.
37 Letter addressed to the Polish President, M. Paderewski, by the President of the
Conference and the French Premier, Clemenceau, transmitting to him the treaty to be
signed by Poland under Article 93 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany (Paris, 24 June
1919). See FRUS, The Paris Peace Conference 1919, vol. VI, pp. 629–34; Temperley, A
History of the Peace Conference, vol. V (Appendix IV), p. 433.
38 Ibid.
39 Hudson noted that the Conference of London in 1832 prescribed form of government to
Greece on the occasion of her admission to the family of nations; the recognition of the
acquisition of the Ionian Islands by Greece in 1864 was made subject to the guarantee of
religious freedom. The Congress of Berlin in 1878 that Clemenceau speciﬁcally men-
tioned was another example he had in mind. He thus concluded that for almost a
century, it had been an established practice, if not a principle of the public law of
Europe, that guarantees to religious minorities should be included among provisions
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precedent in which the Congress of Vienna of 1814 stipulated clear provi-
sions of minority protection while creating the United Netherlands.40 The
most detailed account of such precedents is found in Temperley’s edited
volume, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, published in 1921.
However, his conclusion, which followed an apparently linear narrative of
imposing special minority protection obligations on new States, threw light
on rather a different aspect of the issue – that underlying the general claim
of continuity of a tradition of imposing special minority protection obli-
gations on new States or States to which territories had been ceded, there
was a dichotomy of ‘West’ and ‘East’. Throughout the nineteenth century,
it was generally the non-Western States in Europe who had to consent to
such obligations.41
Berman argues that the very idea of nationalism was at the heart of this
East–West dichotomy. According to him, although the term ‘national’
was not ultimately used in the deﬁnition of protected minorities in the
ﬁnal version of the Treaty, the dichotomy between Eastern and Western
Europe often centred on the implications of the word ‘national’ to
describe the ‘minority group’, and ‘[t]he 1919 debate about the “natio-
nalness” of minorities was understood not only as opposing states to
minorities generally but also as opposing two different cultural concep-
tions of group identity – those of Western and Eastern Europe’.42
Berman’s reference to ‘nationalness’ here needs to be understood in the
nineteenth century’s conservative Romantic sense of ethnicity as the foun-
dation of the nation in contrast to the liberal version that characterises the
Western ‘self ’. The liberal construction of Eastern Europe for the purpose
of a special minority rights regime was premised upon the notion that
Eastern Europe was the ‘home’ of conservative tradition of understanding
the ‘self ’ in ethnic terms. And it is in this process that the East becomes the
‘ethnic other’ of the liberal West, for which ethnicity has no real relevance.
In other words, the minority problem was seen as the result of the con-
servative Eastern tradition of relying on the centrality of ethnicity in nation-
building. As the instrumentalist intuition of this liberal construction
dealing with the transfer of territory inhabited by heterogeneous peoples. See Hudson,
‘The Protection of Minorities’, p. 209.
40 L. P. Mair, The Protection of Minorities – The Workings and Scope of the Minorities
Treaties under the League of Nations (Christophers, 1928), p. 30.
41 Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference, pp. 116–17. Emphasis added.
42 N. Berman, ‘International Law of Nationalism: Group Identity and Legal History’ in
D. Wippman (ed.), International Law and Ethnic Conﬂict (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1998), pp. 40–2.
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informs that the ethnic character of the East is a source of conﬂict it thus
needs to be managed through the minority protection mechanism.
Therefore, it is no surprise that in its Advisory Opinion in the Greco-
Bulgarian Communities case, the Permanent Court found the ethnic
elements, such as ‘sentiment of solidarity’ and the salience of collective
identity, as the attributes of ‘Eastern Countries’. With reference to the
mutual emigration of the Greco-Bulgarian communities, the Court held
the view that the objective features of the community that unites it –
same race, religion, language and traditions of their own – and the
subjective factor, i.e. the willingness to maintain these characteristics,
formed the core of a ‘community’.43 Having so deﬁned the notion of
‘community’, the Court then attributed the ethnic character of the
‘community’ speciﬁcally to Eastern countries, by asserting that the very
structure of the Greco-Bulgarian Convention (1919) that provided for
the population transfer was designed to ensure that the individuals
forming the communities could respectively make their homes perma-
nently among their own race, ‘the very mentality of the population con-
cerned’.44 Such an arrangement had its justiﬁcation in the century-old
(conservative) tradition of the Eastern countries, which the Court thought
necessary to take into account in dealing with the case before them.
As a matter of fact, the protection of the League was not extended to
any minorities within the Western States. Although German minorities
suffered in a number of States both under and outside the League
jurisdiction, Germany itself adopted increasingly brutal policies towards
the minorities within its borders, and the League had no means to stop
that.45 Yet, while refuting the criticism that the Paris Conference did not
bring defeated Germany under the minority protection obligation,
Temperley relied on the scope of the provisions that these obligations
were meant for completely new States, or States to which very extensive
territories were assigned.46 He thus argued that it would have been
inappropriate to bring Germany under such a minority protection
mechanism, in that she was neither newly emerged, nor gained any
territory following the war.47 Temperley then warned that the inclusion
of Germany could have jeopardised the interests of other Great Powers,
43 Advisory Opinion, PCIJ Report (1930), Ser. B, No. 17, p. 33. 44 Ibid., p. 21.
45 J. J. Preece, ‘Minority Rights in Europe: from Westphalia to Helsinki’, (1997) 23(1)
Review of International Studies, 75–92. Also, J. Preece, ‘National Minorities and
International System’, (1998) 18(1), 17–23.
46 Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference, p. 141. 47 Ibid.
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who also had signiﬁcant minorities within their territories, by engender-
ing a universal system of minority protection and thereby bringing them
under international scrutiny.48 It is implied that only the non-Western
States could be under such international supervision.
Thus, France and Italy, despite receiving extensive territories populated
by minorities, similarly remained conspicuous exceptions to the League’s
scope of minority protection. France was not even asked to guarantee the
protection of German minorities in Alsace-Lorraine; it was generally
regarded as a case of annexation, hence no question of special obligation
was raised.49 Similarly, despite receiving South Tyrol with a quarter of a
million ethnic Germans and 480,000 Yugoslavs, Italy was also exempted
from any minority protection obligation. Although unlike Alsace-
Lorraine, in the case of Trentito, a suggestion was made that Italy provide
guarantees for the protection of German minorities, the Italian delegation
held to the view that it was entirely inconsistent with its position as a
principal Power to have any such suggestion made.50 Therefore, Italy
remained outside the scope of the minority protection mechanism.
Thus, the dichotomy of West and East within Europe is demonstrated
in two ways: ﬁrst, the problem of minorities is articulated as a concern
for Eastern Europe alone by attributing ‘special needs’ for these States
due to the different characters of these people, to use Temperley’s words,
as well as the conservative tradition of emphasising the centrality of
ethnicity in the nation-building process. Second, to deal with these
minorities, the political independence of East European States was
restricted by international minority protection treaties and thereby,
‘internationalising’ the minority issue, to use Berman’s term.51 While
the sovereign prerogatives of these countries were made subject to the
protection of their minorities, the Allies continued the deference to
Western European sovereignty in refusing to extend international scru-
tiny to all League members.52 Even in the case of the restoration of
Belgium, no such restriction to her sovereignty was imposed; instead,
she enjoyed an unqualiﬁed right to self-determination, despite her het-
erogeneous demographic composition.53
48 Ibid., p. 142. 49 Hudson, ‘The Protection of Minorities’, p. 212.
50 Comments made by Hudson in an interview. See ibid., p. 474.
51 Berman, ‘But the Alternative is Despair’, pp. 1858–9.
52 Hudson, ‘The Protection of Minorities’, p. 49.
53 Number seven of Wilson’s fourteen points states that: ‘Belgium, the whole world will
agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty
which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as
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However, this ethnic discourse on the ‘self ’ and the ‘other’ was not
conﬁned to the dichotomy of liberalism and conservatism alone. As the
following discussion reveals, the tripartite interactions among minor-
ities, their host-States, and kin-States – all in the process of deﬁning the
‘self ’ in the ethnic term, within the conservative Romantic framework –
exposed the practical drawbacks of the inter-war minority protection
mechanism.
IV. The ethnic ‘other’ within the ethnic ‘self ’: a case of
reciprocal exclusion
While re-creating Poland as a sovereign State, the Versailles Treaty
unmistakably envisaged the Polish State along the conservative ethnic
line. Article 91(2) of the treaty allowed Poland to deny citizenship to
certain ethnic German residents in Poland.54 Simultaneously, clauses 4
and 9 of the same Article provided for the inclusion within the Polish
State of certain Poles who usually resided outside the territory of the
new State.55 Poland was then evidently determined to undo the
Germanisation project advanced under Prussian rule. Nevertheless, in
the actual implementation of this conservative nationalist project, the
matter became much more complicated, given that as a precondition to
the reacquisition of her sovereignty, Poland had to extend Polish citizen-
ship to certain ethnic Germans who were born in Poland of ‘parents
habitually resident there, even if at the date of the coming into force of
the present Treaty, they were not themselves habitually resident there’.56
this will serve to restore conﬁdence among the nations in the laws which they have
themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another.
Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever
impaired.’
54 Article 92(2) reads: ‘German nationals, however, or their descendants who became
resident in these territories after 1 January 1908, will not acquire Polish nationality
without a special authorisation from the Polish State.’
55 Clause 4 of Article 91 of the Versailles Treaty stipulates that: ‘Poles who are German
nationals over 18 years of age and habitually resident in Germany will have a similar
right to opt for Polish nationality.’ Again Clause 9 of the article mentions that. ‘[. . .]
Poles who are German nationals and are in a foreign country will be entitled, in the
absence of any provisions to the contrary in the foreign law, and if they have not
acquired the foreign nationality, to obtain Polish nationality and to lose their German
nationality by complying with the requirements laid down by the Polish State.’
56 See Article 4 of the Polish Minority Treaty. According to Article 91(1), ‘German
nationals habitually resident in territories recognised as forming part of Poland will
acquire Polish nationality ipso facto andwill lose their German nationality.’Article 91(3)
stipulated that within a period of two years after the coming into force of the present
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When the Polish government refused to extend Polish nationality to
former German nationals if their parents were not habitually resident in
Poland both on the date of birth of the persons concerned and on the
date of the enforcement of the Treaty, the Permanent Court in an
Advisory Opinion held that such an interpretation by Poland amounted
to breach of her international treaty obligations.57
In contrast, with the drastic defeat in the war and with no immediate
hope of altering the Versailles settlement, German ofﬁcials learned, at
least ofﬁcially, how to keep its nineteenth-century notion of ethnic
nationalism at distance for an interim period that lasted only a little
more than a decade. Although there existed an ultra-nationalist urge for
confrontational policies towards Poland and the other Eastern European
States, where a signiﬁcant number of ethnic Germans faced discrimina-
tory treatment, the ofﬁcial position in the 1920s held that a ‘correct
relation’ had to be maintained with these countries.58 The German
Foreign Minister, Gustav Stresemann, was the proponent of such a
policy with the strategic argument that if there were no Germans in the
Eastern European countries, it would be difﬁcult for Germany to
advance its revisionist agenda. Thus, Stresemann took the policy of
internationalising the plight of German minorities by joining the
League and positioning Germany as the ‘Protector of Minorities’ for
the continent.59 As a part of the same project, Stresemann advocated for
liberal minority schools within Germany with a view to rationalising the
claim of more extensive rights for the overseas German minorities.60 In
the meantime, generous support was extended to a number of organ-
isations, such as the European Nationalities Congress, to voice the rights
of minorities, especially, German minorities. Protecting the Kultur of the
ethnic Germans in the ceded territories was also a great concern, which
demanded government aid to German newspapers as well as to boarding
schools and club houses.61 Yet, in another strategic move, Germany
avoided any direct ofﬁcial involvement with minority organisations in
the ceded territories; instead, it adopted a policy of supporting German
minorities through a number of covert organisations.62
Treaty, German nationals over 18 years of age habitually resident in any of the territories
recognised as forming part of Poland will be entitled to opt for German nationality.
57 The Question Concerning the Acquisition of Polish Nationality Case, PCIJ Report (1923),
Ser. B, No. 7.
58 Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, p. 35. 59 Ibid., p. 38.
60 Frenz, A Lesson Forgotten, p. 160. 61 Ibid., p. 143.
62 A. Komjathy and R. Stockwell, German Minorities and The Third Reich (Holmes and
Meier Publishers, Inc., 1980), pp. 1–3.
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However, the German politics on the minority issue drastically
changed with the seizure of power by the Nazis in 1933. Being premised
on the nineteenth-century concepts of Romanticism and cultural spe-
ciﬁcity as well as polygenic social Darwinism, the racial theory of law
proposed that each of the various races and peoples had its own
law which was inseparably bound up with that speciﬁc race or people;
law was so speciﬁc to the cultural understanding that it could be neither
replaced by the law of another people nor transferred to another race.63
Under such a construction of law, the obvious question was whether any
idea of international law could be compatible with the Nazi ideology. In
fact, shortly after the seizure of power by Hitler, Nazi international lawyer
Schecher in a publication of 1933 reduced the whole idea of international
law to ‘an emblem of rules belonging exclusively to the German order of
law’.64 Nevertheless, such an approach to international law was pragmati-
cally and strategically difﬁcult to advance, given Germany’s then weak
military and economic position. What followed was a series of reconcilia-
tory approaches to international law. Carl Schmitt, for example, in an
article published by the National Socialist Party in 1934, explicitly pre-
sented the subjective dimension of international law, which for him had
the foundation in the volkische character of States.65 For him, the idea of
law, Nomos, supposed a concrete order and a concrete community that
stood above individuals in contrast to what the liberals proposed.66 This
idea of speciﬁcity premised upon the interplay of land and race found
expression in his famous (or infamous) theory of Grossraum (Grand
Space), developed in line with the American Monroe doctrine.67
63 Ibid.
64 See J. H. Herz, ‘The National Socialist Doctrine of International Law and the Problems of
International Organisation’, (1939) 54(4) Political Science Quarterly, 539.
65 A. Carty, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberal International Legal Order Between 1933 and
1945’, (2001) 14 Leiden Journal of International Law, 31 (emphasis in original).
66 A detailed criticism of individualism and liberal imperialism through the use of interna-
tional law as a tool by the Anglo-American liberals appeared in his work, The Nomos of
the Earth. See, C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus
Publicum Europaeum (Telos Press, Ltd., 2003 [1950]). Although published in 1950, this
volume was completed just before World War II ended. Given that by that time the fate
of Germany was more or less decided, much of his racial ideas did not appear directly in
The Nomos of the Earth; rather, the book warns about the dominance of the Anglo-
American ideologies and their potential disastrous consequences for the post-World
War II world order.
67 D. F. Vagts, ‘International Law in the Third Reich’, (1990) 84 American Journal of
International Law, 687–90; Carty, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Critique’, pp. 34–47; A. Gattinni,
‘Sense and Quasisense of Schmitt’s Grossraum Theory in International Law –
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However, within the top Nazi ofﬁcial circle, Schmitt’s theory of Grossraum
got translated, much to the denial of his intellectual contribution, into the
theory of Lebensraum (Living Space) that entitled Germany as a racially
superior State to expand spatially as far as its biological needs carried it and
in whatever manner it was deemed necessary for this purpose.68
Against this politico-legal backdrop, the Nazi lawyers thus claimed
that treaties were binding as long as they did not jeopardise the racial
health of a people; war, not law, was the ultimate arbiter of international
order.69 With such a perception of international order, Nazi Germany
decided on a more explicit and direct involvement in the minority
affairs. Given the racial foundation of the regime, such claims for
involvement were often propgated along the lines of ethnic afﬁliation
with the minorities.70 Juxtaposing the ethnic phenomenon of minorities
with the individualist framework of the minority protection mechanism
under the League, Schmitt similarly argued that Germany must be
assigned a special role in the minority protection system to protect the
‘Eastern space’ from the ideological hegemony of liberalism; there had to
be a defence of the national peculiarity of each ethnic group against
Western assimilation, and it had to be by Germany.71
Nazi Germany, under Hitler and his aides such as Himmler, was
committed to its long-standing agenda of Germanising of Eastern
Europe. However, such a vision of Germanisation was different in charac-
ter to previous efforts, in that it was set to advance the nineteenth-century
German philosophy of historicism and race on a previously unforeseen
scale. Their invasion policy was marked by the conviction that the Eastern
territories were what the Teutonic knights occupied many centuries ago.72
But to match the racial underpinnings of the regime, such re-occupation of
the ‘ancient territories’ had to be conducted to the exclusion of everything
else. Such an idea was also rationalised by the social Darwinist notion of the
‘survival of the ﬁttest’. In his classic work, Behemoth, Neumann explains
how the Nazi idealists had recourse to the works of the nineteenth-century
A Rejoinder to Carty’s “Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberal International Legal Order
Between 1933 and 1945”’, (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law, 57–62.
68 Carty, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Critique’, p. 74; Vagts, ‘International Law in the Third Reich’, pp.
687–90.
69 For details, see, Vagts, ‘International Law in the Third Reich’, pp. 692–3; also, Mazower,
Hitler’s Empire, pp. 44–5.
70 For example, in a debate in the League Assembly in 1933, the German delegate defended
interventions by the kin-States along the line of ethnic afﬁliations. See League of Nations
Ofﬁcial Journal, spec. supp. 120 (1933), 23.
71 See Carty, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Critique’, p. 40. 72 Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, p. 181.
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polygenist Gobineau, which were later reworked by Houston Stewart
Chamberlain and Richard Wagner. They, along with conservative nation-
alist Friedrich List, offered the Nazis necessary ideological foundation for
advancing imperialism on the basis of race.73
Himmler is reported to have said with reference to his predecessors’
mild approach to Germanisation: ‘Our mission is not to Germanise the
East in the old sense – bringing the German language and laws to those
living there, but rather to ensure that in the East dwell only men with
truly German, Germanic blood.’74 That was an open agenda for complete
expulsion of the ‘other’, which of course was later to materialise into
something much more sinister. Again, for Himmler such measures to
reﬂect the diverse but increasingly serious nature of the policies
employed, were part of the ‘necessary ethnic separation of races and
peoples in the European New Order as well as in the interest of the
security and purity of the German Reich’.75
However, before such an exclusionist mission could be realised, the
Nazi regime directed its minority policy towards transforming the inter-
national mechanism of minority protection under the supervision of the
League into a bilateral issue, thereby, facilitating its involvement as a kin-
State. Sidelining the British and the French, Germany started negotiating
with the States hosting German minorities in bilateral terms. In this
context, Schmitt argued that since the Reich had concluded a series of
bilateral treaties for the protection of German minorities, the Versailles
Treaty for minority protection was ﬁrmly rejected.76 While Schmitt
perceived such a disavowal of the Versailles system as an essential step
towards the creation of Grossraum, other Nazi jurists, too, generally
conceived bilateralism as a necessary attempt to minimise international
law to contractual relations among individual States.77
Given that Poland was also unhappy about the Versailles arrange-
ments (their special obligations regarding minority protection), by
concluding a ten-year non-aggression pact on 26 January 1934, the
Nazi regime offered Poland an incentive to violate her international
treaty obligations. The pact allowed Germany considerable time for
73 F. Neumann, Behemoth (Ivan R. Dee, 2009 [1942]), pp. 98–111.
74 Quoted in Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, p. 181.
75 Quoted in ibid., p. 247. See also, M. Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New Story (Pan Books,
2001 [2000]).
76 See, Carty, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Critique’, p. 43.
77 For the details of this argument, see Herz, ‘The National Socialist Doctrine of
International Law’, p. 547.
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rearmament, but simultaneously offered Poland an opportunity to re-
Polonise the Prussianised Poles, as well as to clear up the border regions
by displacing the disloyal German elements.78 So, induced by the
German politics on the minority issue, Poland increasingly deviated
from the treaty obligations, and later, in November 1937, jointly signed
the Minority Declaration with Germany, formally declaring the question
of minority protection as a bilateral issue between them, and thereby
accepting Germany as an advocate for German minorities.79 As a prin-
ciple it was clearly contrary to the Versailles understanding that kin-
States would be kept out of minority affairs.
Having gained a recognised position in minority affairs inside Poland,
Germany was now better equipped to manoeuvre the minority issue
internally and internationally, and set a premise for her revisionist claims.
At the same time, Poland relied on de-Germanisation in the process of
constructing her own ethnic self-image, which the Great Powers moder-
ately authenticated at Versailles. Even after the Declaration, ‘untrustwor-
thy’ German families were relocated or expelled from strategically
important areas under the Frontier Zone Decree of 22 January 1927.80
The overall number of German minority schools and the percentage of
German pupils declined, despite high demand for such schools.81 Although
‘land reform’ had been a key policy of de-Germanisation since the begin-
ning, the situation of the German minorities deteriorated signiﬁcantly
during this time. The area of German land redistributed, almost exclusively
to Poles, under the land reforms, increased from 8,444 hectares in 1936 to
20,325 hectares in 1937; 22,254 hectares in 1938; and 22,732 hectares in
1939.82 These land ‘reforms’ caused severe unemployment among the
Germans, who were then compelled to emigrate to Germany.83
Thus, the foregoing account of the treatment of minorities in pre-
World War II Germany and Poland demonstrates how the task of
mutual exclusion of the ethnic ‘other’ was advanced in the process of
constructing their ethnic self-image along the line of the conservative
78 Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities and The Third Reich, pp. 71, 73.
79 Ibid., p. 85. Behind the Declaration, the Polish motive was to gain commitment from
Germany regarding the non-violation of Polish rights in Danzig. Poland also had the
hope that such a declaration would ameliorate the condition of 1,300,000 Poles inside
Germany who were outside any special minority protection mechanism. Hitler, on the
other hand, had the purpose of neutralising Poland before taking over Austria and
invading Czechoslovakia.
80 Ibid., pp. 86–7. 81 Frenz, A Lesson Forgotten, p. 226.
82 Komjathy and Stockwell, German Minorities and The Third Reich, p. 87.
83 Frenz, A Lesson Forgotten, p. 248.
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tradition of the nineteenth century. Although the extent of the measures
employed in the process are in no way comparable, the ethnic dichotomy
of ‘self ’ and ‘other’ continued to inform the whole structure of the
campaign that took ﬁnal shape in the midst of the war.
V. Concluding remarks
The inter-war international law of minority protection relates to the
nineteenth century’s ethnic dichotomy of the European ‘self ’ and the
non-European ‘other’ as expressed in colonialism, in that the same
ethnic discourse on ‘self ’ and ‘other’ was translated through the liberal
and conservative traditions into the dichotomy of the liberal Western
‘self ’ and the conservative non-Western ‘other’ within Europe. The
regime also witnessed the exclusionist response to the ethnic ‘other’ –
minorities – in the process of constructing the ethnic self-image. At the
same time, the inter-war minority protection mechanism demonstrated
a tension that resulted from the efforts to reconcile the liberal assimila-
tionism of the West with the ethnic underpinning of conservative
minorities and their host-States in East Europe.
Nazism collapsed, as did the minority protection mechanism with its
guarantor, the League. But the liberal–conservative dichotomy within
Europe, as well as the tension emanated from the response of liberal
individualism towards the ethnic phenomenon attributed to the concept
of ‘minority’, survived much beyond the inter-war international law.
International protection of minorities in the aftermath of theWorldWar
II, especially in the post-Cold War context, continued to demonstrate
such a phenomenon. In this sense, the inter-war minority protection
mechanism could be understood as an important link between the
nineteenth-century ideas of colonialism and the post-World War II
regime of minority protection, in each of which the ethnic dichotomy
of ‘self ’ and ‘other’ expressed through the liberal and conservative
streams provides the necessary analytical framework for a better under-
standing of international law as was applied to these systems and also
constructed in the process.
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